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A ‘last-minute’ transit contract?
Russia-Ukraine-EU gas talks
Szymon Kardaś, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Sławomir Matuszak
On 21 January another round of trilateral gas talks between Russia, Ukraine and the European 
Union was held in Brussels. This meeting mainly concerned the new Russian-Ukrainian transit 
contract; the transit contract currently in force between Gazprom and Naftogaz will expire as 
of 1 January 2020. During the meeting, European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič 
submitted proposals to the parties concerning the parameters of a new contract transit, but 
did not make them public. The meeting was the latest in this series of trilateral gas talks; the 
previous round was held in Berlin in July 2018. In Brussels Russia declared its willingness to 
conclude a new transit agreement, although it highlighted the need for the legal dispute be-
tween Naftogaz and Gazprom to be resolved before that could happen.
The lack of success during the talks so far, the divergent interests of the various parties and the 
current political context suggests that a new contract transit will probably only be concluded 
by the late autumn or winter of this year, and possibly in the period immediately before the 
expiry date of the current contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom. It is also conceivable that 
the negotiations will be extended into 2020, and that meanwhile transit will take place on 
the basis of principles agreed in the short term, along the lines of the so-called winter pack-
ages in 2014 and 2015, something which would be very disadvantageous for Ukraine and the 
EU, but extremely convenient for Moscow. There is no reason to expect rapid progress in the 
Russian-Ukrainian negotiations; they are proceeding in complicated conditions, including the 
ongoing political conflict between Kiev and Moscow, the numerous legal disputes between 
Naftogaz and Gazprom, the construction of new Russian export pipelines, the continuing fun-
damental reform of the Ukrainian gas sector, and finally a packed political calendar (for both 
Ukraine and the EU) in 2019. The negotiation process is also difficult because of the contradic-
tion between the long-term interests of Ukraine, which wants to maintain its status as a key 
transit route for Russian gas in the long term, and Russia, whose strategic goal is to become 
independent of the Ukrainian transmission network.
Old format – new edition
The trilateral format for talks on the transit of 
Russian gas via Ukraine was initiated by the Eu-
ropean Commission in Warsaw in May 2014. 
According to the original assumptions, con-
sidering the de facto suspension of the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian contracts for the supply and 
transit of gas (both became the subjects of 
dispute in the arbitration proceedings), the tri-
alogue’s1 primary function is to work out the 
1 ‘European Commission’s statement following the meet-
ing of EU Commissioner Günther Oettinger, Russian 
Energy Minister Alexander Novak and Ukrainian Energy 
Minister Yuriy Prodan’, 2 May 2014, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-361_en.htm
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ad hoc rules for the supply and stable transit of 
Russian gas via Ukraine to the EU (the so-called 
winter packages)2 every year, before each win-
ter season. The newest version of the trialogue 
is aimed at developing the rules for transit co-
operation between Russia and Ukraine in the 
longer term.
The January talks in Brussels were attended by 
EC Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič, the Russian 
energy minister Alexander Nowak, the Ukraini-
an foreign minister Pavlo Klimkin, and the heads 
of Gazprom and Naftogaz, Alexey Miller and 
Andriy Kobolev. During the meeting, Vice-Pres-
ident Šefčovič submitted to the parties a pack-
age of compromise proposals concerning the 
parameters of a new contract (its duration, the 
volume of transit, the transit tariffs), but did not 
reveal them the public. According to media re-
ports, Brussels proposed to the parties a mini-
mum 10-year contract for the transit of 60 bcm 
of gas per year. The talks also focused on the is-
sue of the implementation of the so-called Third 
Energy Package in Ukraine, and the demand for 
gas in Europe, and were preceded by bilateral 
meetings between the European Commission 
with Ukraine and Russia.3 The trilateral meeting 
2 The first so-called winter package, laying down the prin-
ciples for buying Russian gas by Ukraine and the transit 
of gas from Russia via the Ukrainian route to European 
customers in the period from November 2014 to March 
2015, was adopted in October 2014. In September 2015 
this format was also used to establish the principles of 
gas cooperation between Russia and Ukraine during the 
period from October 2015 to March 2016.
3 ‘Statement by Vice-President for Energy Union Maroš 
Šefčovič following the trilateral talks with Russia and 
Ukraine on the future of gas transit via Ukraine’, 21 Jan-
uary 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATE-
MENT-19-562_en.htm
did not produce any measurable results on any 
of the topics discussed.
The context of the Russian-Ukrainian 
gas negotiations
The expected lack of progress in the negotia-
tions so far is a consequence of the complex 
context in which they are being conducted. The 
ongoing legal disputes between Gazprom and 
Naftogaz mainly result from the verdicts by the 
Court of Arbitration issued in December 2017 
and February 2018, which went against the 
Russian side. The balance sheet from the judge-
ments reveals Gazprom’s debt to Naftogaz ($2.5 
billion), which the Ukrainian side has been trying 
to enforce in the courts of the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the US, de-
manding that its claims be met from the Russian 
company’s assets. Gazprom has consistently 
challenged those decisions which went against 
it by initiating appeal proceedings. Additionally, 
in July 2018 Naftogaz initiated further arbitra-
tion proceedings against Gazprom, in which it is 
demanding $12 billion in compensation for the 
losses it has incurred because of the reduced 
transit flows since the activation of the Nord 
Stream 2 and TurkStream gas pipelines.
The transit negotiations have also been hindered 
by Russia’s actions related to the construction 
of routes which can serve as alternatives to the 
transit of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine. In 
September 2018,  the construction of the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline started (according to state-
ments from Gazprom in January 2019, 20% of 
the pipeline has now been built). In November 
2018 the construction of the marine section of 
the TurkStream pipeline was completed, which 
according to plans will be put into service in 
2019 (the first branch has a capacity of 15.75 
bcm, and  is designed to export Russian gas 
onto the Turkish market). Moreover, political 
pressure from the US is still being exerted on 
Germany and the companies involved in the 
Nord Stream 2 project, with the aim of block-
The contradicting goals of Russia and 
Ukraine, the complicated political context 
and the relentless legal claims of both 
parties have led to a lack of progress in 
the tripartite talks on gas transit.
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ing the construction of the controversial pipe-
line (the threat of sanctions, supported by the 
US government, on companies involved in Nord 
Stream 2). The European Commission and some 
member states are also taking action to ensure 
the EU has jurisdiction over the project, which 
would greatly complicate its full use. The emer-
gence of new routes for Russian gas exports 
to Europe would substantially reduce Russia’s 
demand for Ukrainian transit, while the uncer-
tainty about the timing and final form of the 
implementation of both projects and the rules 
for their use makes it difficult to estimate what 
the actual demand for Ukrainian transit capaci-
ty over the next few years will be.
Another factor complicating the formal issues 
related to the possible shape of a new, long-
term transit contract is the ongoing fundamen-
tal reform of the gas sector in Ukraine and the 
implementation of the rules of the so-called 
Third Energy Package4. One challenge may lie 
in the still unfinished process of unbundling, 
i.e. separating the different stages of the value 
chain in the gas sector (including activities re-
lated to gas transmission) and the implementa-
tion of network codes (including the introduc-
tion of a requirement to hold annual auctions 
of gas capacity).
It is also very important that the gas negoti-
ations are taking place in the context of con-
stant Russian military and economic pressure 
on Ukraine. One example of the former is the 
attack carried out in November 2018 on three 
units of the Ukrainian navy, as a result of which 
4 Information on the status of implementation of the so-
called Third Energy Package on the Energy Communi-
ty’s website. ‘State of compliance’, https://www.ener-
gy-community.org/implementation/Ukraine/Gas.html 
the Ukrainian ships and the 23 sailors on them 
were detained. The latest example of econom-
ic pressure is Russia’s extension in December 
2018 of its list of sanctions to include selected 
Ukrainian enterprises and the introduction of 
an embargo on imports from Ukraine of a num-
ber of commodity groups. According to various 
estimates, this embargo could lead to a drop in 
the value of Ukrainian exports to the Russian 
Federation of about $450-550 million.
An additional complicating factor is the upcom-
ing elections in Ukraine and the European Un-
ion. In March this year Ukraine will hold the first 
round of presidential elections, and parliamen-
tary elections are scheduled for October, after 
which long talks on the formation of a coalition 
and government are likely to occur. This may 
mean that by the end of the year Kiev will have 
a problem putting a delegation together for 
the trilateral negotiations. In parallel, there will 
be elections to the European Parliament in May 
this year which, with regard to the formation of 
a new group of personnel in the EU institutions, 
will generally hamper their smooth operation 
until at least November 2019.
Russia’s strategic and tactical goals
Independence from the Ukrainian transit route 
is one of the strategic goals of Russian energy 
policy. Much indicates that Russia’s main aim 
within the framework of the tripartite negoti-
ations is to conclude a temporary transit agree-
ment which would regulate the conditions for 
the transit of Russian gas via Ukraine until such 
time as it can make full use of the new gas ex-
port pipelines. In 2019, Gazprom will be able to 
divert a maximum of 15.75 bcm to the alterna-
tive routes; this will happen if the announced 
launch of the first branch of TurkStream comes 
to pass, as this would offer an alternative route 
for supplies to the Turkish market. Nord Stream 2 
will be completed in 2020 at the earliest. Con-
sequently, as shown by the data from recent 
years (see appendix), Gazprom will be forced 
The gas negotiations are taking place in 
the context of continuous Russian military 
and economic pressure on Ukraine.
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to use the Ukrainian transit network at levels of 
between 51 and 77.7 bcm of gas until at least 
2020, unless there is a drastic fall in demand on 
the European market. If the Russian company 
can use the full transmission capacity of Nord 
Stream 2 and TurkStream in 2021, it will com-
pletely abandon the transit of gas via Ukraine.
So far, the statements by the Russian side sug-
gest that Moscow is ready for several variants 
of compromise on the transit question.
The first involves concluding the transit con-
tract based on the transfer of relatively small 
volumes (10-15 bcm). This variant was suggest-
ed back in April 2018 by Gazprom’s CEO Alexey 
Miller, although it is unclear whether this would 
be a short-, medium- or long-term contract.
The second variant would envisage guarantees 
of long-term transit for Ukraine, while simul-
taneously guaranteeing Russia the trouble-free 
operation of Nord Stream 2 (this could be al-
lowed by German political action within the 
EU to neutralise attempts at restricting the 
pipeline’s operation). This variant seems more 
likely, as revealed by German statements dur-
ing bilateral talks with Russia; this includes 
a statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel after 
talks with President Vladimir Putin in August 
2018, in which she said that the launch of Nord 
Stream 2 should not contribute to the loss of 
Ukraine’s transit significance.
The third option would involve Russia’s con-
sent to the conclusion of a long-term contract 
if Kiev is ready to agree upon a new supply 
contract. Although Ukraine is not interested in 
a new contract for gas supplies from Russia, 
it cannot be ruled out that Russia will submit 
a package deal in the course of further talks. 
This interpretation was suggested in a state-
ment by Gazprom’s CEO Alexey Miller, who 
declared during the last tripartite meeting 
in Brussels that Gazprom “is ready to extend 
both of the 2009 contracts without any addi-
tional consultations”, referring to the contracts 
for transit and gas supplies to Ukraine. For his 
part, Alexander Nowak stressed that if there 
is a new transit contract, it should be guid-
ed by a balance of interests along the lines of 
what happened when the 2009 contracts were 
signed (the Russian-Ukrainian transit contract 
and the contract for the supply of Russian 
gas to Ukraine were signed in parallel). The 
Russian energy minister also added that Kiev 
is currently meeting Ukraine’s own gas needs 
from imports of Russian gas from the West, 
which means higher costs for gas consumers 
in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russia’s tactical aim remains the 
use of the tripartite negotiations to offset the 
losses incurred by Gazprom in its arbitration 
proceedings with Naftogaz. Russia has made 
its agreement to sign a new transit contract 
conditional on a resolution of the legal dis-
putes between Naftogaz and Gazprom; this 
move should be interpreted as a demand for 
the de facto cancellation of attempts to recover 
the debts awarded to Ukraine by the Court of 
Arbitration in Stockholm. Statements made by 
representatives of the Russian government (in-
cluding Putin) and Gazprom indicate that this 
is a sine qua non for the agreement of a new 
contract transit.
Moreover, Russia is interested in dragging out 
the negotiation process, counting on political 
changes in Ukraine after the presidential and 
parliamentary elections scheduled for 2019. 
Moscow expects that the new Ukrainian gov-
ernment will be willing to reach an agreement 
on terms which favour Russia. Besides, Russia 
hopes that by the end of the year it will have 
made significant progress in the construction of 
Nord Stream 2, and will be able to resolve the 
question of extending the TurkStream pipeline’s 
Although it has declared its readiness 
to agree upon a new transit contract, 
Moscow would most prefer to conclude 
a temporary agreement.
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second branch5, which will strengthen Mos-
cow’s bargaining position in its talks with Kiev.
Ukraine’s objectives and strategy
Ukraine’s strategic goal is to ensure the greatest 
possible volume of Russian gas is transported via 
its territory for as long as possible. The optimal 
solution would be to conclude a new long-term 
contract with a ship-or-pay clause and high tran-
sit rates. The possible loss of transit country status 
would be a serious blow to Kiev, both politically 
and economically. In the Ukrainian government’s 
opinion, the Kremlin’s fear of disruption to the 
flow of gas to the EU was one of the most impor-
tant factors which have inhibited Russian aggres-
sion against Ukraine on a wider scale. Likewise 
for Brussels, and also for some member states, 
Kiev’s transit role was the cause of the EU’s in-
creased involvement and interest in maintaining 
stability on the Dnieper. On the other hand, from 
the economic perspective, gas transit is a very 
important source of income, amounting to 
$3 billion in 2017 and $2.2 billion during the first 
three quarters of 2018. This is almost equivalent 
to Ukraine’s total expenditure on all imported 
gas ($3.2 billion in 2017). According to estimates 
from the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, if transit 
is halted, the direct losses resulting from a drop 
in the export of services alone will amount to 
2.5-3% of the country’s GDP.
Another challenge is maintaining the viability of 
the transit gas transmission system (GTS). Ac-
cording to estimates by Naftogaz, the minimum 
amount of gas to be transported so that the 
GTS does not suffer losses is 40 bcm per year6. 
5 S. Kardaś, ‘Pipeline success for Russia: TurkStream’s off-
shore section completed’, OSW Analyses, 23 November 
2018; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/ 
2018-11-23/pipeline-success-russia-turkstreams-off-
shore-section-completed 
6 С. Головнев, ‘Сможет ли «Газпром» отказаться от 
украинского транзита газа’, Business Censor, 14 Janu-
ary 2019, https://biz.censor.net.ua/resonance/3106056/
smojet_ li_gazprom_otkazatsya_ot_ukrainskogo_
tranzita_gaza?fbclid=IwAR0ZNfqZxKqx0QsPI8gL-
3wqo1L8e4btxsWdoJ-anbH_ZuWXTokrYIieP82k
If Russian gas transmission stops completely or 
is limited to 10-15 bcm, doubts will arise as to 
whether there is any sense maintaining the ex-
pensive infrastructure capable of transporting 
the gas, up to 178.5 bcm annually according to 
Ukrainian estimates.
All this means that Ukraine is still the main op-
ponent of Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, and 
it has been leading an intensive lobbying cam-
paign against them, primarily in EU institutions. 
However, the effectiveness of these activities 
has been severely limited due to the Ukraini-
an actors failing to take a consistent position. 
The most active role in trying to block Nord 
Stream 2 is being played by Naftogaz, rather 
than the state institutions. Initially, the com-
pany wanted to achieve this goal by attracting 
a Western investor for the transit gas pipelines. 
This solution was allowed thanks to a law on 
the gas market in Ukraine (adopted in 2015) 
which stated that the operator of gas pipelines 
should come from a country belonging to the 
European Energy Community or the United 
States (which clearly excludes Russia). This in-
vestor would be interested in keeping as much 
transit of Russian gas running via Ukraine as 
possible; however, their involvement would be 
conditional on a prior unbundling of Naftogaz, 
which still has not occurred because of a con-
flict between the company’s management and 
the government (in particular the representa-
tives of the Ministry of Energy). In the absence 
of any coordination with the central authori-
ties, Naftogaz’s attempts to find an investor 
have been doomed to failure. This has even led 
to a situation where the government and Naf-
togaz have been holding talks independently 
The possible loss of Ukraine’s status as 
a transit country would be a serious blow 
to Kiev, both politically and economically.
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with potential investors in the Ukrainian trans-
mission network.
Recently, Naftogaz’s management has changed 
tactics. On 9 January Andriy Kobolev announced 
that the company is willing to withdraw from 
the aforementioned lawsuit against Gazprom 
in the amount of $12 billion on condition that 
a new long-term contract for the transit of Rus-
sian gas is signed, although he has not given 
any details of this proposal.
The lack of coordination within Ukraine has also 
been demonstrated by the situation regarding 
the transit rates. The National Committee for 
Energy Regulation (NKRE) introduced tempo-
rary rates as of 1 January 2019, which are half 
the amount of the previous ones, a step which 
is intended to encourage EU fuel consumers to 
buy gas transported using the Ukrainian GTS. 
This move has met with sharp criticism from 
Naftogaz, who say that the low rates threaten 
the GTS operator’s financial stability.
The aims of the EU’s involvement, and 
the political & institutional constraints
The main aim of the EU’s involvement is to 
guarantee the security of Russian gas supplies 
to European customers. Recent proposals by 
the European Commission indicate that the EU 
would be interested in a new long-term Rus-
sian-Ukrainian transit contract. But so far there 
is no consensus within the EU on what specifi-
cally the future role of Ukrainian transit in sup-
plying Russian gas to Europe should be (includ-
ing what volumes and duration of the transit 
agreement would be desirable for European 
consumers of Russian gas). Countries support-
ing the implementation of Nord Stream 2 and/
or TurkStream (such as Germany and Austria) 
see Ukrainian transit as an important risk factor, 
and seem inclined to significantly limit its role 
in supplying Russian gas to the EU. Meanwhile 
countries opposing the new Russian projects 
see maintaining a key transit role for Ukraine 
as an essential element for stability and energy 
security, also in the EU.
In recent months the European Commission, 
acting as a mediator, has included other issues 
relevant to Russia-Ukraine-EU gas cooperation in 
the transit negotiations, in particular issues re-
garding Nord Stream 2, amending the gas direc-
tive, the issue of unbundling in the Ukrainian gas 
sector and its modernisation, and finally issues 
of implementing the arbitration verdicts in the 
legal disputes between Gazprom and Naftogaz.
However, the overly broad scope of negotia-
tions, together with a lack of unanimity with-
in the EU as to what form of gas relations it 
desires with both Russia and Ukraine, has lim-
ited the effectiveness of the EU’s involvement 
in the transit negotiations. Another challenge 
may come from unilateral action by member 
states, which would reduce the European Com-
mission’s effectiveness within the talks’ trilat-
eral format. One example is the activity of Ger-
many in 2018; in parallel with its support for 
the implementation of the controversial Nord 
Stream 2 project, began to conduct its own dis-
cussions on the future transit of Russian gas via 
Ukraine. This was not consulted or coordinated 
with other EU countries or the European Com-
mission. Maintaining this transit was discussed 
both during meetings between Chancellor 
Merkel and President Putin, and during Ger-
man-Russian meetings at the ministerial level.
Forecast for the tripartite negotiations
Although the next ministerial meeting is sched-
uled for May this year, it is unlikely that a new 
transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine 
will be concluded before the end of 2019. The 
most likely scenario is that the Russian side will 
The possible loss of Ukraine’s status as 
a transit country would be a serious blow 
to Kiev, both politically and economically.
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drag out the negotiations for as long as possi-
ble, pending the outcome of presidential elec-
tions in Ukraine (the first round will be held 
on 31 March) and the  parliamentary elections 
in October. Russia is hoping that groups will 
come to power in Kiev who are more inclined 
to compromise; it has special hopes of Yulia 
Tymoshenko, who in 2009 agreed to sign a gas 
supply agreement which was very favourable 
to Moscow (it is no coincidence that the next 
round of talks will be held after the election 
of Ukraine’s new president). Also, as the expi-
ry date of the current transit agreement comes 
closer, the EU countries, in particular Germany, 
concerned about possible problems with gas 
supplies, could increase pressure on Ukraine 
to give way to the Russian demands. Finally, in 
the near future the effectiveness of the talks’ 
trilateral format, or even the EU’s entire policy 
in this area, will be weakened by the political 
calendar: on the one hand the upcoming elec-
tions to the European Parliament (and therefore 
the end of the mandate of both the EP and the 
present EC); and on the other the decision by 
Maroš Šefčovič, who has been conducting the 
trilateral talks, to stand in elections for the pres-
idency of Slovakia (he has temporarily ceased 
to work for the Commission as of February this 
year, and will be replaced by Manuel Canete).
It thus seems very likely that the new transit 
contract will be agreed just before the expiry 
of the current transit agreement, and its final 
form will primarily be the result of political cal-
culations by the entities involved in the negoti-
ation process.
It is also possible that the negotiations will be 
dragged out until 2020. In this case, transit 
would be regulated by short-term ad hoc ar-
rangements between the parties, like the so-
called winter packages agreed in 2014-2015. 
This would be very inconvenient for Kiev, but 
nevertheless Ukraine would be interested in 
keeping the stable transit and maintaining its 
reputation as a reliable transit country. Such 
a situation would most of all favour Russia, 
in whose interests lie the transitional arrange-
ments to ensure the transit of gas via the 
Ukrainian system until the new export routes 
can be launched. At the same time, this would 
pose a challenge both to Kiev (which wants to 
guarantee the use of its national infrastruc-
ture in the longer term) and the EU, as it seeks 
a more durable and stable framework for the 
supply of Russian gas.
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APPENDIX
Transit of gas via Ukraine, if Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream are activated and used to full capacity
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data published by Gazprom
The forecast is based on the volumes of Russian gas transit via Ukraine in the years 2015-2018.
Fact Forecast
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
via Ukraine 67,1 82,2 93,5 86,8 51-77,7 51-77,7 51-77,7 35,6-62 0-7
Nord Stream 2 - - - - - - - - 55
TurkStream (branch 1) - - - - 15,75 15,75 15,75 15,75 15,75
TurkStream (branch 2) - - - - - - - 15,75 15,75
